Resilience Factors in Influence Operations in the Context of CTI Analysis
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Keywords

cyber threat intelligence
defense strategy
disinformation
influence operations
narrative warfare
societal safety

How to Cite

Filipkowski, P., & Kalpokas, I. (2025). Resilience Factors in Influence Operations in the Context of CTI Analysis. Safety & Defense, 11(2), 17-27. https://doi.org/10.37105/sd.268

Abstract

This paper investigates the strategic deployment of disinformation as a tool of influence operations, focusing on Russian campaigns targeting perceptions of Ukrainian refugees in Poland and the EU. Utilizing the Diamond Model for Influence Operations and supported by Cyber Threat Intelligence analysis from Recorded Future, the study identifies key actors, audiences, capabilities, and infrastructure involved in these malign efforts. The authors argue that disinformation is not merely a spread of falsehoods, but a deliberate manipulation of narratives designed to exploit technological affordances and societal vulnerabilities. The research highlights how emotionally charged content, algorithmic amplification, and coordinated bot activity contribute to the virality and perceived credibility of disinformation. The case illustrates how Russia seeks to fracture European solidarity, delegitimize Ukraine, and erode public support for humanitarian and military aid. The findings underscore the importance of societal resilience, advocating for enhanced media literacy, institutional trust, and multi-level countermeasures. Ultimately, the paper concludes that combating influence operations requires a holistic approach that integrates technological, regulatory, and educational strategies to mitigate the impact of strategically crafted disinformation.

https://doi.org/10.37105/sd.268
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