Irregular Warfare and Modern Defense – Counterinsurgency Operations
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Keywords

defense
insurgency
counterinsurgency operations (COIN)
modern warfare
irregular warfare

How to Cite

Denysiuk, I. (2020). Irregular Warfare and Modern Defense – Counterinsurgency Operations. Safety & Defense, 6(2), 1-11. https://doi.org/10.37105/sd.71

Abstract

Nowadays, there are a lot of dangers, not only those related to the military. Particular attention should be paid to the threat of guerrilla activity. Therefore, the aim of this article is to indicate the essence of contemporary guerrilla operations in conflicts, and their methods of operation that allow them to achieve their goals. It was also assumed that the modern crisis response operations, and especially COIN (counterinsurgency) operations, constitute a comprehensive approach to counteracting guerrilla activity.

This article uses theoretical methods. Using the analysis and synthesis of materials and studies, the most important conclusions were pointed out.

The leading role in prevention insurgency activities lies with the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and their crisis response operations. In the Strategic Concept NATO 2010 specialists are putting more attention to conducting counterinsurgency operations (COIN). COIN operations are nowadays the most comprehensive tool for combating guerrilla activity, which mainly hits the civilian population. The concepts of using the assumptions of anti-Partisan operations should be implemented on a full scale, including in the armed forces of the Republic of Poland.

Particular attention should be paid to the threat of the guerrilla activity in conflicts. These problems are complex and they deal with many aspects (social, economic, cultural, political and many others). Moreover the partisans activities are irregular and they are often targeted at civilians. This article indicates the methods and techniques used by insurgents in the fight against the state / government. Reference has also been made to the activities that inhibit their activity - complex counterinsurgency operations.

https://doi.org/10.37105/sd.71
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